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WHEN FREEDOM IS NOT FREE: INVESTIGATING THE
FIRST AMENDMENT'S POTENTIAL FOR PROVIDING




This article explores the ways in which bodily expression can
constitute symbolic speech that courts should protect pursuant to
the First Amendment of the Constitution. In a previous article, I re-
ferred to this type of bodily speech as "body protest."' Body protest
can refer to actions that individuals undertake to assert their auton-
omy, identity, and freedom from societal restrictions. For women,
body protest may be used "to challenge gender restrictions and to
activate women-centric legal reforms."2 For example, women may
express body protest through dance, dress, or performance arts. These
individuals are often sexually profiled because of how they use their
bodies. This article analyzes the sexual profiling issues inherent in
grooming cases within the context of First Amendment jurispru-
dence in the public employment sphere and argues that the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of expression offers a basis to
expand upon personal rights in grooming cases.
The goal of this article is to argue that by placing body protest
and other expression that occurs in public employment appropriately
within the scope of the First Amendment, society can eradicate wide-
spread gender bias in the workplace. Part I of this article discusses
why the First Amendment should be strengthened as a cause of
action in gender-based grooming cases. Part II presents evidence of
sexual profiling in rape cases, which reflect society's attitudes towards
women's grooming choices. Parts III and IV analyze sexual profiling
in the workplace, the treatment of gender-based grooming policies
and sex stereotyping under Title VII, and the utilization of conduct
as gender-based expression under the First Amendment. Part V
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Female Body as a Redemptive Tool against Trinidad's Gender-Biased Laws, 13 DUKE J.
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2. Id. at 179.
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seeks to reconcile sexual profiling claims brought under the First
Amendment with Supreme Court jurisprudence from Pickering v.
Board of Education, Connick v. Myers, and Garcetti v. Ceballos. And
last, Part VI considers the possibility of learning by analogy from the
sexual orientation cases.
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INTRODUCTION
While the attainment of political rights does not always solve
inequalities and human rights violations,' it is also true that with-
out the extension of fundamental political rights, significant issues
and concerns are often not given the scrutiny and importance they
require.4 A number of political rights have been recognized in the
3. See Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulations of
Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV 11, 26 (2006)
(discussing the inability of antidiscrimination laws to protect personal identity). Some
scholars move from a rights discourse to an equality discourse when dealing with issues
related to personal appearance:
Why have academics largely ignored the rights-based possibility for pro-
tecting personal appearance choices in private spheres? It may be because
the academy is court-centric. Thus, equality rhetoric gets more attention
than rights or freedom rhetoric when it comes to "private" spheres like the
workplace. Because of the state action doctrine, courts generally cannot step
into a "private" arena like the workplace and hold that an employer has in-
fringed upon a personal liberty. Only state actions can infringe a consti-
tutional right under this doctrine; private actions or state inactions cannot.
Id. at 26-27.
4. See id. at 11, 27 (discussing the need to protect freedom of dress).
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gender context; two of the greatest are voting rights for women5 and
the right to sue for gender discrimination under Title VII.6 Convert-
ing these political gains into actual manifestations of equality, how-
ever, is an ongoing task.7 Some important questions remain to be
answered. What happens when we face issues that indicate a need
to formulate solutions in terms of formal political rights, but also
require us to formulate standards that tackle the root of actual and
pervasive gender discrimination? How do we use existing formal
structures to eradicate the foundational notions that allow actual
gender inequality to fester?
Consider the following hypothetical situation:' Marcia works in
a government office and regularly comes to work in a short skirt and
suggestive blouse. She is a good employee who acts and works with a
self-assured and direct manner. Concerned, her employer meets with
her in private and mandates that she dress more "appropriately" for
the office. Unwavering, Marcia retorts that her choice of clothing is
an integral part of her identity that cannot be regulated by external
influences.9 She maintains that her dress, just like the way she talks
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
7. SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: WOMEN'S RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
THE LAW 288 (2003); see also Sylvia A. Law, Where Do We Go from Here? The Fourteenth
Amendment, Original Intent, and Present Realities, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
691 (2004) (discussing the ongoing progression of women's rights).
8. Marcia is a fictional character used to showcase the type of scenario that could
give rise to First Amendment expression issues in regard to dress and/or conduct in the
employment setting. For an example of a dispute arising from self expression in the
private workplace, see Bjornson v. Dave Smith Motors/Frontier Leasing & Sales, 104
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (2008). In 2004, Sheryl Bjornson filed a lawsuit against her
employer based on "claims of a sexually hostile work environment, gender discrimination,
and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 66. To support her
claims, Bjornson testified that her supervisor, Joe Orsi, made comments to managers
and other salespersons about her personal appearance including her clothing, shoes, and
nail polish. Deposition of Sheryl L. Bjornson, at 117, Bjornson v. Dave Smith Motors/
Frontier Leasing & Sales, 104 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (2008) (No. CV 04-285-
N-MHW). Bjornson's co-worker, Mary Crawford, also testified that Bjornson's appear-
ance had become an issue in the workplace. Specifically, Crawford stated that the dress
code at work had become a "constant battle" with Bjornson and that concerns were
raised regarding Bjornson's shoes, undergarments, clothing, and hair. Deposition of
Mary Crawford, at 34-35, Bjornson v. Dave Smith Motors/Frontier Leasing & Sales, 104
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (2008) (No. CV 04-285-N-MHW).
9. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1111-12 (2006).
Clothes and appearance are constitutive of how we see and feel about
ourselves and how we construct ourselves for the rest of the world to see.
Most people give careful thought to how they dress as a part of defining who
they are. We dress to establish an identity and to fit in with some subculture
while rejecting others.
Id. at 1111.
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and walks, is a form of expression that is linked to her identity. Con-
sequently, she finds any attempts to restrict her manner of dress to
violate of one of her fundamental rights. In light of her blatant refusal
to follow her employer's orders, Marcia is fired. Marcia then seeks
legal vindication and validation of her perceived fundamental right.
This hypothetical situation captures the legal impasse that exists
for anyone who seeks protection from tacit or overt restrictions on
dress, grooming, and other forms of bodily expression.' 0 In our juris-
prudence, cases involving grooming issues have triggered various
Title VII analyses," which, thus far, have been inadequate to afford
the desired legal protections to complainants. 2 This problem is exac-
erbated when the issue centers on gender-specific dress and conduct
codes." As difficult as it is for an individual to find legal protection
for identity-inspired conduct or dress choices in general, our society
and jurisprudence have been even more reticent to recognize a pro-
tected right for employees to dress and behave outside of societal
gender norms.'4
This problem is compounded by feminist jurisprudence's own
ambiguous stance on the issue." Third Wave Feminism, for example,
has advocated and accepted agency as an essential element of any
exploration of women's rights." Thus, under Third Wave Feminism,
10. See Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that the state failed to protect
individual freedom in the private sphere). Note that grooming choices may also be ex-
pressive of political and public values by communicating an opinion on gendered norms
in the workplace.
11. Julie A. Seaman, The Peahen's Tale, or Dressing Our Parts at Work, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POLY 423, 426 n.19 (2007) ("These cases arise primarily under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... which generally prohibits sex discrimination in the
workplace, but they also may be brought under state anti-discrimination statutes and,
in the case of public employees, § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.").
12. See Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 67.
13. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 426-27.
14. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that plaintiff failed to prove that she was terminated because of her failure to
conform to gender stereotypes in the way she dressed); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that discrimination based on a man's
hair length is not sex discrimination); Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F.Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.
N.Y. 1985) (holding that requiring male attorneys to wear neckties, while not requiring
female attorneys to wear them, is not impermissible sex discrimination).
15. Alexandre, supra note 1, at 182.
[Fleminist discourse has been extremely conflicted on the idea of the body
as a tool for renegotiating gender roles. While most feminists would acknowl-
edge the traditional use of sex to oppress and dominate women, very few of
them give real credence to female bodily expression as a successful and useful
conduit for negotiating gender classifications.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16. Lynn S. Chancer, From Pornography to Sadomasochism: Reconciling Feminist
Differences, 571 ANNAIS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 77, 86 (2000); Bridget J. Crawford,
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women are not mere victims of patriarchal structures, but are actors
and agents of change. 7 Their agency can take the form of subversive
as well as overt acts of rebellion."8 There exist, then, millions of possi-
bilities as to what "women's rights" actually mean for women in the
Third Wave era. In light of these potentially conflicting meanings,
how do we proceed to argue for universal women's rights and how do
we reconcile our advocacy for women's rights with conflicting views
of appropriate dress and behavior for women? As long as this ambi-
guity persists, will we ever completely eradicate gender bias? Ex-
ploring the use of "body protest" in the public employment context
is a first step toward exploring the ways in which autonomy can be
exercised to break gender norms.
Consequently, this article explores the ways in which an em-
ployee's bodily expression can constitute types of speech that should
be constitutionally protected by courts pursuant to the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution. In a previous article, I referred to these
types of bodily speech as "body protest."19 While this article primar-
ily focuses on issues facing women, body protest can refer to acts by
individuals of both genders that defy gender stereotypes.2 ° This is
because both males and females are burdened by societal pressure
to comply with masculine ideals.2' Appearance "is a . . . powerful
factor affecting employment opportunities and status for those who
do not comply with the dominant masculine norm; this includes both
women and men who are considered to have an inferior masculine
gender."22 This, however, does not mean that women and men are
treated equally in the workplace.23 Historically, societal barriers re-
quire women to surmount incommensurable obstacles in order to
succeed in the workplace.24
Body protest refers to actions and grooming decisions taken by
individuals to assert their own autonomy, identity, and freedom from
Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography, and the Praxis
of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 151-52 (2007).
17. See Crawford, supra note 16, at 152; see also Natalie Fixmer & Julia T. Wood, The
Personal is Still Political: Embodied Politics in Third Wave Feminism, 28 WOMEN'S STUD.
COMM. 235, 237 (2005) (arguing that this movement builds solidarity among women).
18. Fixmer & Wood, supra note 17, at 242-44.
19. Alexandre, supra note 1, at 178.
20. See Catherine Harwood, Dressed for Success? Gendered Appearance Discrimination
in the Workplace, 38 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 583, 586 (2007) (discussing the
idea that both women and men face sex discrimination based on a masculine norm).
21. Id. at 586-87.
22. Id. at 586 (citation omitted).
23. Id. (quoting NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH 48 (Chatto & Windus 1990)).
24. See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, WOMEN AND WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: OVERCOMING
BARRIERS TO GENDER EQUALITY 23 (2003); Megan Erb, Red Light, Green Light: Assessing
the Stop and Go in the Advancement of Women in the Legal and Business Sectors, 14
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 393 (2008).
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societal restrictions.2" Moreover, body protest can refer to specific
instances where women use their bodies:
to challenge gender restrictions and to activate women-centric
legal reforms. It also encompasses the therapeutic goals of assert-
ing dominance over one's body and of facilitating one's expression
of womanhood in revolt against a patriarchal society. Instances
of body protest include, but are not limited to, women's use of
their bodies through dance, dressing, performance arts, etc. For
example, certain women choose to dance suggestively, dress con-
trary to societal standards of propriety, perform sexually explicit
artistic roles, bring attention to specific body parts, and adopt sex-
ually explicit personas in order to highlight the societal restraints
imposed on them."
Recent incidents, such as the Rutgers/Don Imus controversy 7 as
well as the current pervasive discourse surrounding non-traditional
women, confirm that women are regularly sexually profiled based
on the way they use their bodies as well as stereotypes associated
with their race.29
This article analyzes the sexual profiling issues inherent in
grooming cases in the context of public employment. This article also
analyzes the potential that First Amendment expression claims hold
for grooming cases in the public employment context. The goal of
this article is to argue for the placement of body protest/expression
that occurs in public employment within the context of the First
Amendment, as the right involved is the fundamental right to expres-
sion free of bias or coercion. Such a fundamental right must, of course,
be appropriately balanced with the interests an employer in a par-
ticular case advances. Placing this debate in the First Amendment
context would rightfully raise this issue to the level of scrutiny that
it deserves and would signal a clear commitment to the eradication
of widespread gender bias. Furthermore, this heightened treatment
25. See Alexandre, supra note 1, at 179.
26. Id. (footnote omitted); see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 186 (1993)
(discussing how clothing can be an expression of a woman's state of mind).
27. RORY O'CONNOR &AARON CUTLER, SHOCK JOCKS: HATE SPEECH & TALK RADIO 15
(2008).
28. See, e.g., Alexandre, supra note 1, at 178-79 (discussing women who use body
protest to defy gender stereotypes); Harwood, supra note 20, at 583 (discussing workplace
discrimination based on nontraditional gender expression).
29. See O'CONNOR & CUTLER, supra note 27, at 15; Alexandre, supra note 1, at 180
("Sexual profiling is rooted in the gender stereotypes historically associated with women's
bodies. The belief in the inferiority of women's bodies dates as far back as biblical
writings.... Beliefs regarding women's physical or genetic inferiority translated into
beliefs in women's psychological and mental inferiority.").
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would help curtail the employer practice of pretextual termination
or punishment of employees.
The scope of this article is limited to investigating the possibili-
ties for protecting body protest in the public employment sector.3 0
This article is divided into the following parts. The first part discusses
why the First Amendment is beneficial as a cause of action in gender-
based dress and grooming cases. The second part uses rape cases to
illustrate evidence of sexual profiling in society. The third and fourth
parts analyze the treatment of gender-based grooming policies and
sex stereotyping under Title VII, and the use of conduct as a form of
expression under the First Amendment. The fifth part attempts to
reconcile First Amendment sexual profiling claims with the Supreme
Court jurisprudence from Pickering v. Board of Education,31 Connick
v. Myers32 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.33 Finally, the sixth part considers
the possibility for learning by analogy from the sexual orientation
cases.
I. WHY USE THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE
GENDER-BASED GROOMING CASES
The First Amendment is the ideal context for litigating grooming
cases because it provides the most potential for addressing and de-
constructing the inherent gender bias associated with gender-based
expectations of dress or conduct.34 Grooming standards regulate some
of the most intimate parts of a person: her body and her right to uti-
lize and construct it as she pleases.3" One's right to bodily integrity
is now a familiar concept in our jurisprudence.36 For instance, courts
have triggered this concept when dealing with the right of privacy
in abortion and contraception cases. 37 This right to bodily integrity
is also of particular importance when dealing with grooming standards
in the workplace.3" Requiring women to adhere to gender stereotypes
30. For the sake of efficiency, I chose to limit my discussion to the First Amendment
implications of body protest in the public workplace.
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
33. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
34. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 10-19 (1997) (discussing various stereotypes of black women).
35. Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 34.
36. Id. at 33-34. ('The Supreme Court, as well as many commentators, has recognized
a fundamental right to bodily integrity in the Due Process Clause. Additionally, many
courts and commentators have discussed a right to bodily privacy." (footnote omitted)).
37. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
38. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2557-58 (1994).
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in their grooming choices infringes upon their right to bodily integ-
rity. Yet, as evidenced by recent grooming cases, Title VII has gener-
ally been ineffective in offering redress to employees alleging harm
from gender-based restrictive policies.3" Deference to the employer's
interest in preventing a disturbance has overwhelmingly been suffi-
cient to counter discrimination claims under Title VII.4° Thus, further
legal measures are necessary to protect individual grooming choices.
I recognize that other scholars have offered different solutions
to circumvent Title ViI's hurdles, such as the creation of a new
cause of action, "freedom of dress," as cleverly proposed by Gowri
Ramachandran,4' and the right to privacy construct proposed by
Catherine Fisk.42 Still, the First Amendment is appropriate and
efficient in that it already offers protection to the forms of expres-
sion that the plaintiffs seeking reprieve from gender-based grooming
cases exhibit.43 In addition, using an existing doctrine of law might
be more effective than the development of a new doctrine in encour-
aging courts to reject employers' grooming standards than the devel-
opment of a new doctrine.
Additionally, using the First Amendment to address and eradi-
cate gender bias in the public employment context is an actual as well
as symbolically powerful weapon. The First Amendment is a sacro-
sanct, fundamental right in our jurisprudence and in our lay culture.
Considering that gender-based grooming policies attack the very
essence of one's right and ability to express oneself,44 it would be fit-
ting for litigants to use this cause of action. Furthermore, the judi-
ciary's use of the First Amendment, a universally revered doctrine,
39. See Lisa Barr6-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasley, The Road Less Traveled:
Obstacles in the Path of the Effective Use of the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
Against Women Act in the Employment Context, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 415, 425-26
("Although egregious sexual harassment and gender-motivated workplace violence may
technically be redressable under Title VII, there are both procedural and substantive
limitations inherent in Title VII which render it, in certain instances, an ineffective
remedy .. "). For an example of Title VII's ineffectiveness at protecting women from
gender bias at work see also Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106
(9th Cir. 2006) (stating that Jespersen failed to show that a challenged policy requiring
women, but not men, to wear makeup was "a policy motivated by sex stereotyping").
40. See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 2556 (stating that "[ilnstead, courts have resisted
the application of Title VII to dress and appearance requirements, following a variety
of approaches that incorporate and thus, in effect, legitim[izel the community norms").
41. Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 13 ("Freedom of dress is the right to choose the
hairstyle, makeup, clothing, shoes, head coverings, tattoos, jewelry, and other adornments
that make up the public image of our sometimes private persons.").
42. Fisk, supra note 9, at 1112-14 (advocating the use of a privacy analysis, rather than
discrimination, because such an analysis is open to everyone "significantly oppressed by
an unreasonable workplace dress code").
43. See Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 16.
44. Fisk, supra note 9, at 1122.
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to deal with these issues would send a much needed and belated mes-
sage that the eradication of all gender biases is an important goal of
our justice system.
Although the First Amendment applies to only the public em-
ployment setting,45 the expansion of protection to conduct-based
grooming expression in the public workplace may have broader soci-
etal implications. For instance, grooming and dress choices may be
expressive of political and public values. A person's choice of dress
may send a message regarding one's response to the gendered con-
cept of what is "appropriate" in the workplace. Or, manner of dress
may express a response to the commodification and homogenization
of dress and grooming options in corporate America. Perhaps by recog-
nizing women's bodies as important tools for expression in the public
workplace, courts will create a persuasive argument for the protec-
tion of a person's gendered identity in other areas of law. Further-
more, breaking sex stereotypes in the public workplace, and perhaps
indirectly in other spheres, may change societal and judicial attitudes
as to the extent in which employers' grooming policies will be toler-
ated when they impose sex stereotypes on employees.46
To adjudicate grooming cases under the First Amendment, I pro-
pose that we consider these cases on a case by case basis whereby
the employee's interest in bodily integrity and the First Amendment
right to expression would be weighed against the public employer's
interest in having an undisrupted employment setting. The balancing
test created in Pickering v. Board of Education4' and currently used
in public employment First Amendment cases could be applied to em-
ployees claiming violations of their First Amendment rights based
on grooming standards. Under this balancing test employees could
show that their dress and grooming choices are: 1) of public concern,
2) causally related to the adverse employment action that they suf-
fered, and 3) protected speech.4" Employers would have to show how
the employee's choice of grooming disrupts the work environment. 49
The standard for "disruption" in this context should be an objective
45. Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 26.
46. For the purposes of this article, I am limiting my discussion to body protest in the
public employment setting. The implications of this issue in the private sphere, including
prostitution and private employment, are worth exploring in subsequent projects.
47. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
48. See id. at 568-74; Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing
the necessity of showing a causal connection between employee speech and the adverse
employment action before the Pickering balancing test can apply).
49. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (clarifying Pickering's balancing test by
stating "that the speech involved [must] 'substantially interferef' with official respon-
sibilities").
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rather than a subjective one.5" Thus, it would not be enough for the
employer to show that the other employees or customers are merely
uncomfortable with the plaintiffs grooming choices. Furthermore,
employers should be required to show that there are no other, less re-
strictive, alternatives than limiting the plaintiffs grooming choices
and that the plaintiffs grooming choices absolutely prevent the exe-
cution of his or her duties.
Through the use of the First Amendment, courts could limit em-
ployers' ability to create grooming standards based on gender norms.
Deconstructing these biased expectations51 would be crucial in fur-
thering the goal of eradicating gender bias across all spheres.5 It
would also serve the equitable goal of ensuring that tacit gender-based
pretexts are no longer used to terminate noncompliant employees.53
II. EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL PROFILING IN RAPE CASES
Sexual profiling is rooted in the restrictive, biased meanings and
expectations associated with actions taken by each gender.54 These
expectations and socially-constructed meanings permeate every aspect
of life.55 Yet they come to life more particularly in the rape context,
which clearly illustrates society's view of what constitutes appropriate
behavior and manner of dress for a woman.56 In a survey conducted
by Amnesty International, a quarter of respondents felt that "a woman
wearing a provocative outfit is at least partly to blame - especially
if she has been drinking." 57 This view undoubtedly captures the way
50. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (illustrating the Supreme Court's analysis of
the alleged disruption based on the facts presented and determining that the employee's
actions did not disrupt the proper performance of his duties); see also Connick, 461 U.S.
at 166 (discussing that objective evidence, not mere apprehension of disruption, is nec-
essary under Pickering).
51. See ARISTOTLE, THE GENERATION OFANIMAIS 11 (A.L. Peck trans., Harvard Univ.
Press rev. ed. 1953) (discussing gender expectations).
52. See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 2542-43 (discussing the "gap between a law's reach
and the aspirations of those who seek to accomplish substantial societal reform').
53. See Consuela Pinto & Joan Williams, Hidden Gender Bias in the Workplace, HR
MANAGEMENT, http://www.hrmreport.com/currentissue/article.asp?art=273512&issue=
250 (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
54. Seaman, supra note 11, at 461-62.
55. See id. at 424-25 ("Dress therefore serves various signaling and expressive func-
tions in addition to its more mundane purposes of bodily protection and warmth.... For
example, a business suit on a man might signal status and self-restraint... [however]
a woman in an identical men's suit sends yet another set of signals entirely." (footnotes
omitted)).
56. See Tom Parry, Rape Victims Asking for It,'MRROR, Nov. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.mirror.co.uklnews/tm objectid=1639392 1&method=full&siteid=94762
&headline=asking-for-it-name-page.html (discussing perceptions that "[w]omen who
flirt, get drunk or wear sexy clothes are asking to be raped).
57. Id.
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some jurors view victims of rape."8 These so-called myths about the
relationship between women's manner of clothing and the likelihood
of rape also affect the way potential rapists choose their victims.5 9
According to recent studies, "[p]otential rapists 'are more likely than
other males ... to hold callous attitudes about rape and to believe
in rape myths...." " The gender bias myths about women inviting
rape through clothing or behavior are also ingrained in women them-
selves.61 Women sometimes blame a victim of rape because of her
manner of dress, and as a result even victims of rape themselves are
often reluctant to report the crime to the authorities because of these
stereotypes.62
The reluctance and fear of judgment is even stronger when the
rape is committed by an acquaintance." In acquaintance rape situ-
ations, "[t]he victims may erroneously believe that their behavior
brought about the rape and thus attribute the blame to themselves
for reasons such as wearing a short skirt or letting the perpetrator
walk them home."64 Considering this pervasive attitude, it is not
surprising that similar sexual stereotyping detrimentally impacts
the workplace, where women are highly likely to experience violence
58. Robert Wilson, Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Application
of the Pickering Test, 18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 389, 409 (2008).
The jury may sometimes disregard the judge's instructions, not by judging
the law, but by passing personal judgment on one of the parties to the
litigation.... [A] 1966 study of American juries indicated that juries con-
victed defendants of rape only sixty percent of the time, less that [sic] almost
any other serious violent crime .... This trend was apparently based in
sexist assumptions prevalent in society at large ... that "women who are
victimized are themselves to blame for their own fate because they are either
seductive or unresisting."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
59. Robert Z. Hazelwood & Janet I. Warren, The Serial Rapist, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS
OF RAPE INVESTIGATION: AMULTIDSCIPLINARYAPPROACH 337,353 (Robert R. Hazelwood
& Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 2d ed. 1995).
60. Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm: Why Miller Should
Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611, 631 (2008) (quoting Neil M. Malamuth,
Aggression Against Women: Cultural and Individual Causes, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL
AGGRESSION 19, 23 (Neil M. Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984)).
61. Scott D. Carman, Commonwealth v. King's 'Rirst Complaint Doctrine" The Voice
of Injustice May Speak Loudly When Rape Victims are Silenced, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV.
631, 654 (2008).
62. See id. at 653-54 (discussing victims' fear of tarnishing their reputation and belief
that their behavior caused the rape).
63. Id. at 654.
64. Id. (footnote omitted).
[The vast majority of rapes are actually committed by someone that the
victim is acquainted with, related to, or intimately involved with.... The
victims often do not report rapes committed by acquaintances because they
feel that they gave the perpetrator a false impression that they consented
to the sex and, therefore, they take responsibility for this misunderstanding.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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from acquaintances.65 Violence against women affects businesses as
well as the women themselves.66 For example:
"Fear of gender-motivated violence restricts the hours during
which women can engage in a variety of activities and seriously
curtails their participation in the commerce of our nation." With
women representing such a large part of the American workforce
and of American consumers and producers, the effect violence
against women has on the national economy cannot be ignored.67
Dismantling the gender-based stereotypes about women, including
acceptable behavior and manner of clothing, is thus one of the im-
portant areas to target in trying to curtail violence against women.6"
Violence against women will not be diminished simply by deal-
ing with the after-effects of the violent act or by mere punishment
of the violent perpetrator.69 The prevalence of violence against women
is linked to a pervasive attitude toward women's bodies and the re-
strictions thought to apply to them in various spheres.70 The insidi-
ousness of this attitude is captured in bold relief by examining the sex
stereotyping of female rape victims' manner of dress and behavior.
These attitudes or myths are used as excuses by perpetrators or sex-
ual profilers to negatively impact women. 71 To begin to significantly
solve the problem of bias against women, our legal system must
tackle the problem at its roots: by giving all conduct or types of cloth-
ing worn by women, including those traditionally classified as socially
65. Margaret A. Cain, Comment, The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against
Women Act: Its Legacy and Future, 34 TUISA L.J. 367, 381 (1999) ("'The U.S. Justice
Department estimates that, in 60,000 incidents of on-the-job violence each year, the
victims know their attackers intimately."').
66. Id. at 381-82.
Violence against women significantly affects the bottom line in businesses....
Statistically women who are abused or suffer sexual assault are more likely
to be less productive in the work place and have a higher rate of absentee-
ism .... Domestic violence alone "has been estimated to cost employers
between 3 to 5 billion dollars annually due to absenteeism in the workplace."
This does not include medical costs which have been estimated at close to
$100 million dollars annually. Additionally, victims of domestic violence are
often harassed in their work place, "prevented from arriving to work on time,
and kept from attending work altogether because of serious injuries."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 382 (footnotes omitted).
68. See Sarah Gill, Essay, Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes: Using Education
to Prevent Date Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 62 (1996) (arguing that education about
gender stereotypes and rape myths is necessary to reduce date rape).
69. See id. at 79.
70. Id. at 34-35.
71. Id. at 50 (stating that "date rapist[s] ... [have] socially acquired beliefs about
rape myths, sexual aggressiveness, and gender and race stereotypes").
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unacceptable, legitimate status as protected expression.72 The pro-
tected status in question should not be any different than other types
of actions that have been worthy of First Amendment consideration
by our jurisprudence.7 3
III. TREATMENT OF GENDER-BASED GROOMING POLICIES AND SEX
STEREOTYPING UNDER TITLE VII
A. General Grooming Standards Under Title VII
Currently, many plaintiffs bring grooming cases under the sex
discrimination provisions of Title VII. The resulting jurisprudence
arising from these claims has been highly unsatisfactory, however.
Discussed below are the short-comings of Title VII in regard to groom-
ing cases, which illustrate why the First Amendment provides a more
beneficial cause of action for public employees.
To prove discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show
"that the challenged employment action was either intentionally
discriminatory or that it had a discriminatory effect on the basis of
gender. Once a plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, '[t]he
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."'7 4 Courts
have dealt with both employers' grooming standards as well as with
the idea of sex stereotyping in the employment context through the
use of Title VII.75 Under this cause of action, an employee can bring
72. See Alexandre, supra note 1, at 185-87 (discussing women's conduct that society
views as unacceptable).
73. Currently, however, there exists a sharp contrast between the contemptuous
manner in which women's expression through body or clothing has traditionally been
viewed and the respect accorded to many other forms of expression. See Marrero v.
Camden County Bd. of Soc. Serv., 164 F. Supp.2d 455, 477 (D.N.J. 2001) (demonstrating
judicial attitudes toward women's First Amendment claims based on dress in stating
that "women's fashions seem to change much more rapidly than men's, [therefore] very
little can be concluded . . . from the fact that the dress code committee paid more
attention to women's clothing than to men's"). In contrast, Morse v. Frederick illustrates
that even a student's rebellious action of holding a banner at a school event stating "BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS" has triggered a thorough First Amendment analysis by the Supreme
Court - an analysis not granted to women's grooming choices. See generally, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (2007). But gender-based grooming choices are of parallel importance to this type
of expression and therefore should be granted a similar First Amendment analysis.
74. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the burden shifting test laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) (citations omitted)).
75. Seaman, supra note 11, at 426-27.
Courts have for years addressed challenges to employer dress codes that
differentiate between men and women in conformance with widely-accepted
social dress norms.... [The increasing judicial acceptance of the sex stereo-
typing theory of sex discrimination under Title VII is in substantial tension
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a suit alleging discrimination as a result of an employer's grooming
standard or sex stereotyping when the employer's decision or behavior
was clearly motivated by gender."6
Both the sex stereotyping cases and the grooming cases that have
been litigated under Title VII, however, have revealed the limitations
of this statute." The courts' treatment of both types of claims dem-
onstrates a definition of discrimination limited to extreme, offensive,
or openly hostile behavior by the employer.7' Furthermore, under the
"equal burdens test" established in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating
Co. courts may uphold discriminatory and gender-motivated groom-
ing policies if it is deemed that the employer placed equal grooming
burdens on both genders.79 The problem with this rationalization is
that grooming restrictions that apply to one gender are often patently
different from the ones that apply to the other gender.' This compar-
ative approach between the genders also ignores the fact that gender
restrictions create hierarchies among women as well as between men
and women. Thus, the notion that a woman who is required to wear
makeup is equally situated with a man who is not required to wear
makeup is flawed. As a result, the unequal burdens test that the
courts have developed to analyze the grooming cases leads to a cir-
cular rationale that has proven ineffective to deal with the gender re-
strictive grooming practices that exist in the employment context.81
Jespersen is the leading case on the viability of gender-based
grooming standards.8 2 The plaintiff, Darlene Jespersen, was termi-
nated for refusing to wear makeup while working as a bartender for
a Harrah's casino shortly after a new employee grooming policy was
implemented.
with recent cases that insist that sex-differentiated dress and grooming
requirements that "merely" conform to existing social gender norms do not
amount to impermissible sex discrimination.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 426 & n.19.
77. See Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance
Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 203-06, 209 (2000); Karen
Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of 'Look'ism in Hiring Decisions: How Federal Law Should
be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 431, 442 (2005).
78. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 441 & n. 96 (discussing judicial acceptance of
"appropriate" or "reasonable" gender-based dress codes in contrast to policies utilizing
offensive stereotypes relating to female attractiveness, sexiness, and competence).
79. See id. at 433-34 (describing the unequal burdens test).
80. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that an employer's policy requiring male employees, but not female employees, to wear
a bow tie is not sex discrimination under Title VII); see also Seaman, supra note 11, at
434-35 (analyzing the problems of the Jespersen majority's opinion).
81. Seaman, supra note 11, at 440.
82. See generally Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
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The standards required all bartenders, men and women, to wear
the same uniform of black pants and white shirts, a bow tie, and
comfortable black shoes. The standards also included grooming
requirements that differed to some extent for men and women,
requiring women to wear some facial makeup and not permitting
men to wear any. Jespersen refused to comply with the makeup
requirement .... 83
Jespersen had worked for Harrah's for twenty years with an exem-
plary record. 4 Her conflict with her employer arose only when the
employer implemented the 'Personal Best" grooming policy in 2000.'
The grooming standards of this policy required women to wear make-
up and styled hair, whereas men were prohibited from growing hair
long or wearing facial makeup. 6
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision and
ruled that the employer passed the "unequal burdens" test applied
in grooming cases by also requiring men to wear a uniform and main-
tain their hair at a certain length above the collar.8 7 Title VII's narrow
83. Id. at 1105-06.
84. Id. at 1106-07.
85. Id. at 1107.
86. Id.
Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/female):
Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time
of hire.
* Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple
jewelry is permitted; no large chokers, chains or bracelets.
* No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.
Males:
* Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
* Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at
all times. No colored polish is permitted.
* Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.
* Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non
skid) soles.
Females:
* Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be
worn down at all times, no exceptions.
* Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with
employee's skin tone. No runs.
* Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic
nail art or length.
* Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber
(non skid) soles.
* Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and
applied neatly in complimentary colors. Lip color must be worn
at all times. (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting the Harrah's "Personal Best Policy").
87. Id. at 1111-12.
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scope, which confines discrimination to the unequal treatment of both
genders in similarly situated positions, limits our ability to eliminate
instances of gender bias that cannot be framed within that princi-
ple. Employment standards can promote gender bias for both men
and women - it is generally not possible to find a case where a man
and a woman are situated exactly the same. By their very nature,
most grooming policies will regulate different aspects of women's
appearance than men's appearance. 8 As in Jespersen, for example,
men are generally not allowed to wear makeup at work. 9 Thus, to
require a woman to wear makeup while men are not required to do
so is evidence of a policy that affects one gender disparately.9" It is
also evidence of a policy that uniformly categorizes and stereotypes
men and women.9' The policy assumes that all women are likely to
wear makeup or will only look good if they do so and that men are
only at their personal best if they wear short hair.92 Furthermore,
the manner in which Harrah's implemented the dress code policy was
itself problematic.
Harrah's hired a make-up expert to give each employee a make-
over and then had a photographer take a post-make-over photo-
graph of each employee. Harrah's instructed supervisors to use
the photograph as an "appearance measurement tool": that is,
the supervisor was empowered and encouraged to compare an
employee to his or her photograph on a daily basis to see whether
he or she measured up. The appearance code required females
to wear specific types of make-up: foundation, blush, mascara, and
lipstick. Other requirements included "teased, curled, or styled"
hair and colored nail polish. Jespersen was fired because she chal-
lenged the power of the company to change her appearance.93
88. See e.g., id. at 1109 (stating that "Harrah's 'Personal Best' policy contains sex-
differentiated requirements regarding each employee's hair, hands, and face"); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that some "regulations
[might] require male and female employees to conform to different dress and grooming
standards'); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that an employer's requirement that male employees wear bow ties is not a violation of
Title VII).
89. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107 (observing that the requirements for Harrah's
"Personal Best" program prohibited men from wearing makeup).
90. Jespersen explicitly argued that "it costs more money and takes more time for a
woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it takes for a man to comply with
the requirement that he keep his hair short. . . ." Id. at 1110.
91. See, e.g., Devon Carbado et al., The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work,
in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 150 (Joel WM. Friedman ed., 2006)
("Grooming requirements such as makeup for women and short hair for men are deeply
constitutive of gender; of what it means to be a man or a woman.").
92. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J. dissenting); Carbado et al., supra
note 91, at 109, 111.
93. Fisk, supra note 9, at 1116.
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Not only did this practice thoroughly invade the space and privacy
of the Harrah's employees, it also seemed to create a police state
instead of a mere employment environment.94 Judging by the de-
scription of this practice, working at Harrah's seemingly meant re-
linquishment of all autonomy.95
It is contrary to the spirit of Title VII, which traditionally requires
complete parity when comparing "similarly situated" individuals, to
equate the requirement that a woman wear makeup on the job with
the requirement that a man keep his hair a certain length.96 The
Jespersen analysis illustrates the flaw in current Title VII jurispru-
dence in that it traps us in attempting to equate men with women,
while treating them separately.97 Consistent with previous courts'
treatment of the grooming cases, the Jespersen court erroneously triv-
ialized the effects of the Harrah's grooming requirement,98 which was
laden with meanings that created gender-based hierarchies." Finally,
Title VII jurisprudence ignores one overarching issue - at least as
regards public employers - public employers should not be able to
infringe upon an employee's inherent right of expression by imple-
menting gender discriminatory grooming policies that do not further
a compelling interest for the employer.
B. Sex Stereotyping Under Title VII
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins the Supreme Court prohibited
employers from imposing gender role stereotypes on their employ-
ees. "0 This legal holding proscribed discrimination against employees
94. Cf. Carbado et al., supra note 91, at 151 (questioning how much power employers
should have to "police expressions of gender").
95. See Fisk, supra note 9, at 1117.
More than layering women's faces, makeup has layered the social meaning of
women's identity.... By the early 1900s, makeup was actually employed to
solidify class and racial distinctions. The cosmetics industry created separate
markets for high class makeup, lower class makeup, and African American
makeup. Makeup played a role in keeping women in their place not only with
respect to gender, but with respect to class and race as well.
See also Carbado et al., supra note 91, at 106-07 (footnotes omitted) (discussing the
underlying impact that makeup has on women's identity).
96. See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 2561.
97. Seaman, supra note 11, at 433 (' The presumption behind the unequal burdens
test is that different treatment of men and women is not per se actionable. In essence,
it is the 'separate but equal' standard imported into the law of sex discrimination.").
98. See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 2556-59 (discussing triviality).
99. See Carbado et al., supra note 91, at 110-11. ("Makeup was a means by which
women could transform themselves into gender-role types expected in particular jobs,
such as saleswoman, secretary, or waitress.... Through makeup, women could perform
gender palatability and gender comfort. Makeup signified that gender integration would
not mean the disruption of gender hierarchy.").
100. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989).
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who fail to act within stereotypical roles regarding their particular
gender. Although this decision proved to be a great advancement in
limiting employers' ability to restrict an employee's identity based
on gender roles, many circuit courts have specifically recognized per-
sonal grooming standards as falling outside of Price Waterhouse's sex
stereotyping analysis.
101
Price Waterhouse involved a plaintiff who was denied partnership
in an accounting firm because her behavior was considered too mas-
culine.102 The record in Price Waterhouse indicated that "some of the
partners found her to be too aggressive."1 3 While some partners
"praised... [Hopkins's] 'strong character, independence and integ-
rity"' other partners stated that she was "'macho"' and needed "to
take 'a course at charm school.' "104 Furthermore, some of Hopkins's
supervisors advised her to "'walk more femininely, talk more femi-
ninely, dress more femininely, wear make up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry.""0 5 Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined
that this type of employment decision-making constituted illegal
discrimination under Title VII. Specifically, the Court held that sex
stereotyping in the workplace is unlawful if the plaintiff shows that
the sex stereotype was "a motivating part in an employment deci-
sion."10' Based on the facts surrounding Hopkins's denial of partner-
ship, the Price Waterhouse Court found that "lilt was... impermis-
sible for Hopkins's employer to place her in an untenable Catch-22:
she needed to be aggressive and masculine to excel at her job, but was
denied partnership for doing so because of her employer's gender
stereotype."'0 7 Thus, the Supreme Court sent a firm message to em-
ployers that subjecting employees to sex stereotypes would not be
tolerated in the workplace.
In contrast, Jespersen's claims were not successful, although the
record in Jespersen, like the record in Price Waterhouse, indicated
that Harrah's policy also interfered with Jespersen's ability to work.1
0 8
Specifically, Jespersen considered it a violation of her identity to be
101. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F.Supp.2d 203, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating
that "courts before and after Price Waterhouse have found no Title VII violation in gender-
specific dress and grooming codes") (citing Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d
1076 (9th Cir. 2004); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000); Harper
v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (1lth Cir. 1998); Tavora v. New York Mercantile
Exchange, 101 F.3d 907 (2nd Cir.1996)).
102. Price Waterhouse 490 U.S. at 234-35.
103. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-46).
104. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
105. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1108.
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forced to wear makeup - "she found the makeup requirement offen-
sive, and felt so uncomfortable wearing makeup that she found it
interfered with her ability to perform as a bartender.""° She had per-
formed her job for twenty years without being forced to wear makeup,
and with no indication that wearing makeup was essential to the
performance of her job.11°
Jespersen described the personal indignity she felt as a result
of attempting to comply with the makeup policy. Jespersen testi-
fied that when she wore the makeup she "felt very degraded and
very demeaned." In addition, Jespersen testified that "it prohib-
ited [her] from doing [her] job," because "[i]t affected [her] self-
dignity... [and] took away [her] credibility as an individual and
as a person.""'
Yet the Ninth Circuit did not have as much sympathy for
Jespersen as the Price Waterhouse Court did for Hopkins."2 Con-
sequently, under current Title VII jurisprudence an employer may
not discriminate against female employees for acting too masculine,
but may impose a dress code requiring female employees to adhere
to grooming standards that fit social notions of femininity. This show-
cases the discrepancy that exists in protection for plaintiffs under
Title VII in that sex stereotyping is unlawful discrimination whereas
grooming policies based on gender norms are not.
Furthermore, unlike the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse, public policy regarding the eradication of gender roles
does not play an important role in the adjudication of grooming
cases." 3 The standard used in this line of cases is the "unequal bur-
dens test.""' 4 According to the unequal burdens test, some gender-
based distinctions are allowed as long as they place an equal burden
on both male and female employees." 5 The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has stated:
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1106-07.
111. Id. at 1108.
112. Compare id. at 1106 (holding that Jespersen had not demonstrated a violation
of Title VII when she was fired for not following her employer's makeup requirement for
women), with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,258 (1989) (holding that Hopkins
had demonstrated a violation of Title VII when she was not given partnership status
because she acted too much like a man).
113. See Carbado et al., supra note 91, at 118, 151 (discussing the public policy impli-
cations of letting judges render decisions regarding society's constructions of masculinity
and femininity).
114. See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108-11 (analyzing Jespersen's claim through the
unequal burdens test).
115. See, e.g., id. at 1110 (explaining that "[u]nder established equal burdens analysis,
when an employer's grooming and appearance policy does not unreasonably burden one
gender more than the other, that policy will not violate Title VII').
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We have long recognized that companies may differentiate be-
tween men and women in appearance and grooming policies, and
so have other circuits. The material issue under our settled law
is not whether the policies are different, but whether the policy
imposed on the plaintiff creates an "unequal burden" for the plain-
tiff's gender. '
In its decision, the Jespersen court interjected its own notions of
acceptable gender constructs into Title VII jurisprudence. It also erro-
neously concluded that to give credence to Jespersen's claims would
be to declare that all grooming restrictions that conflict with an em-
ployee's self image are triable issues under Title VII. "' Such a broad
interpretation is not necessary, however, as only grooming standards
that differentiate between or have a disparate impact based on gender
could constitute discrimination based on sex.118 Although there likely
are restrictions that limit an employee's self image, and yet remain
free from gender bias, such was not the case in Jespersen."9 Harrah's
requirement that all women wear makeup is tightly linked with the
employer's idea of what an attractive woman should look like, and
far less related to business productivity. 20 So is the case with the re-
quirement in the "Personal Best" policy that all women wear their
hair down.12' This policy assumes that to be attractive and accept-
able, a woman must always keep her hair long. So an employee who
wore her hair up, or wore a bald or faddish cut would not fit into the
idea of the suitable woman promoted by the grooming policy. 122 Also,
by mandating that women wear makeup, the employer is arguably
categorizing women as sexual objects rather than employees. 2 3 Sum-
marily, by upholding this grooming policy, the Ninth Circuit further
ingrained normative gender ideals and also the sexualization of
women's bodies into our jurisprudence. Ultimately, the rationale in
Jespersen is another example of Title VII's inability to tackle the
116. Id. at 1ll0 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1112.
118. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2008) (listing sex
as a protected class which may not legally be a basis of disparate treatment or impact).
119. See Alexis Conway, Leaving Employers in the Dark: What Constitutes a Lawful
Appearance Standard After Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.?, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 107, 129 (2007) (discussing the dissenting opinion in Jespersen).
120. See id. at 129-30 ("While the majority in Jespersen noted that the sex-differentiated
grooming policy did not impede Jespersen's ability to perform her job, critics of the
Jespersen decision argue that the makeup requirement of the 'Personal Best' program
had no relationship to either efficiency or productivity.").
121. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107-08.
122. See id.
123. See Conway, supra note 119, at 123 (discussing sex stereotyping and Harrah's
"notion of what a 'real woman' looks like").
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nuances of gender discrimination, particularly as it is manifested in
current times.
124
Although Title VII leaves much to be desired in protecting
women's grooming choices in the workplace, it is important to note
the beneficial impact that Price Waterhouse has had in the realm of
employees' gender-based expression. Although widespread protection
is lacking for the more "benign" sex stereotyping claims, many more
extreme cases of sex stereotyping have been successful under Title
VII in the past decade. 125 In post-Price Waterhouse cases:
Courts [have] recognized claims that sex-stereotyping constitutes
sex discrimination [in] that such cases generally involve facts
which evoke additional sympathy from the federal courts beyond
the sympathy that one might expect being forced to conform to
a sex stereotype would evoke. These facts may be allowing courts
to view such cases as exceptional, even where Title VII doctrine
would seem to imply that they are not.126
One such group that has benefitted from this extended protection is
homosexual employees. For example, the Ninth Circuit has classified
the following as sexual harassment: the taunting of a male employee
for acting in a feminine manner and for not having sexual intercourse
with a female co-worker; and employees forcing a gay employee to
view homosexual pornography and providing him with sexual gifts in
the workplace.127 This protection of severe sex stereotyping has even
filtered into the realm of certain grooming cases. For instance, it has
124. See Allison T. Steinle, Appearance and Grooming Standards as Sex Discrimination
in the Workplace, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 261,268,285 (arguing that Title VII offers "question-
able protection").
125. Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as "Catch 22": Why Identity Performance
Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 314 n.71, 315 (2005).
126. Id. at 315.
127. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., 256 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
Following Price Waterhouse, our court has held that sexual harassment of an
employee because of that employee's failure to conform to commonly-accepted
gender stereotypes is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. In Nichols,
a male waiter was systematically abused for failing to act "as a man should
act," for walking and carrying his tray "like a woman," and was derided for
not having sexual intercourse with a female waitress who was his friend.
Applying Price Waterhouse, our court concluded that this harassment was
actionable discrimination because of the plaintiffs sex. In Rene, the homo-
sexual plaintiff stated that a Title VII sex stereotyping claim because he
endured assaults "of a sexual nature" when Rene's co-workers forced him
to look at homosexual pornography, gave him sexually oriented "joke" gifts
and harassed him for behavior that did not conform to commonly-accepted
stereotypes.
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations omitted).
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been held that forcing women to wear extremely sexually revealing
clothing is evidence of sexual stereotyping."2 Nonetheless, more tradi-
tional cases where employees are forced to conform with stereotypes
have been very difficult to win.
[T]he plaintiff who successfully states a sex-stereotyping claim
has generally been a pre-operative transsexual. In these cases, a
transsexual plaintiffs failure to conform to gender stereotypes
is medicalized through the diagnosis of gender identity disorder.
Thus, nonconformity in these cases may appear as both more
"exceptional" and less of a "choice" to federal judges. '
Although the Jespersen court did not "preclude as a matter of
law, a claim of sex stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance
codes""'3 the limitations of the "unequal burdens test" imposed on
Title VII analysis reinforce the contention that the First Amendment
is better suited to litigate cases of sexual profiling based on dress and
conduct in the public employment context. Furthermore, distinctions
made by courts between "immutable and mutable" characteristics
have presented further obstacles to plaintiffs alleging discrimination
based on grooming.' Generally, while an employee's sex itself has
been found to be an immutable characteristic,'32 grooming choices
have been found to be within the control of the employee and there-
fore not within the purview of Title VII.' 3 While the circuit court's
rationale in Jespersen did not center on a discussion of immutable
characteristics, as did the district court's rationale,' the conclusion
128. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (citing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp 599
(D.N.Y. 1981)).
129. Ramachandran, supra note 125, at 316 (footnotes omitted).
130. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113.
131. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975)
(distinguishing between immutable characteristics and business choices); Lanigan v.
Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (D. Mo. 1979) (discussing immutable versus
mutable characteristics).
132. See e.g., Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing
that a person's sex itself, as opposed to modes of dress or cosmetics, is the immutable
characteristic protected by Title VII).
133. See e.g., id.; Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, Nw., Inc., 230 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1164
(D.Or. 2001).
134. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1192 (D.Nev. 2002);
see also Carbado et al., supra note 91, at 115. Courts tend to provide relief only when
fundamental rights or immutable characteristics are being regulated by employers:
These cases established the so-called sex-plus regime - namely, that it is
impermissible for the employer to discriminate against women based on sex
plus some other aspect of identity. The caveat being that this other identity
characteristic had to be either a fundamental right (for example, the right to
get married) or an immutable characteristic (for example, race). While this
body of law helpfully moved antidiscrimination doctrine beyond the inter-
gender frame, it did little to disrupt the biological/immutability conception
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that Jespersen did not provide sufficient evidence of sex stereotyp-
ing to make a claim under Title VII is reminiscent of this issue. The
Jespersen court appeared to dismiss her concerns regarding Harrah's
grooming requirements, finding the 'Tersonal Best" policy to be a
restriction on mutable characteristics and not discrimination based
on the immutable status of being female. But under this type of
analysis what kind of grooming limitations should rise to the level
of sex discrimination if requirements pertaining to painted nails and
makeup (which are stereotypical as pertaining to the female sex) do
not trigger a discussion of sex stereotyping?
IV. CONDUCT AS EXPRESSION - DECONSTRUCTING GENDER
STEREOTYPES THROUGH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Conduct as Speech
Due to Title VII's inability to sufficiently protect plaintiffs groom-
ing choices, the First Amendment should be further utilized as a
cause of action in grooming cases. Grooming, like many other forms
of conduct, may constitute expression under the First Amendment.
The way a person chooses to express herself, whether in manner of
dress or other forms of symbolic conduct, has distinct repercussions
in whatever sphere she chooses to perform that expression.'35 These
repercussions are especially severe in contexts where the expected
codes of behavior for each gender are deeply ingrained. One such
sphere is the workplace.'36 Whether an employee wears an unconven-
tional skirt or a pantsuit, or utilizes other grooming choices to sym-
bolically express herself contrary to what is expected of her gender,
certain societal codes immediately surface in an attempt to rectify
the perceived problem. An extreme consequence of enforcing these
social codes may even be the loss of employment.'37
of sex discrimination, a conception that another body of case law further
entrenched - the cross-dressing cases.
Id.; see also Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement
in Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2206-07 (2003) (discussing disparate
impact and mutable traits).
135. Cf. Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554, 557 (1940) (describing the repercussions
of an artist's self-expression). The artist projects into the world a part of his personality
which is then subjected to critique, thereby subjecting the artist to possible psychological,
economic, and emotional injury. Id.
136. See Tanya J. Stanish, Comment, English-Only Rules in the Workplace: Discrimi-
nation or Employer Prerogative? A Comment on Spun Steak v. Garcia, 7 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 435, 456 (1995) (discussing sacrifices employees must make regarding their self-
expression).
137. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006)
(illustrating the plaintiff's loss of employment due to her desire to groom herself in a
manner that broke with stereotypical gender norms).
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Statements, in the form of symbols, are made every day through
our clothing and other conduct without the need to exchange words."3
And this idea of symbols as speech is not foreign to our jurisprudence:
We live in a culture of symbols. We speak not only through
our words but through symbolic gestures - our acts, our religious
symbols, and our associations. What we do, what we wear, how
we worship, and with whom we associate are all deeply symbolic
aspects of our cultural life.... What does it mean to burn a draft
card or a cross, to sleep in the park, or to dance in the nude?"3 9
Symbolic speech may take many forms. Over time, the Supreme Court
has explored whether the use of crosses, 4 ' flags,14' draft cards,'42
and even the wearing of armbands constitutes protected symbolic
speech.' 3 Although not all conduct is considered protected speech, 4 4
our jurisprudence has generally recognized the importance of pro-
tecting certain types of symbolic conduct in addition to traditional
pure speech.
145
The Court best defined when this type of symbolic conduct is con-
sidered protected speech in Spence v. Washington.146 In Spence the
Court recognized that when conduct is "a pointed expression" as
opposed to "mindless nihilism" it may be protected under the First
Amendment.147 "[U]nder this approach, conduct is analyzed as speech
under the First Amendment if, first, there is the intent to convey a
specific message and, second, there is a substantial likelihood that the
138. Timothy Zick, Cross-Burning, Cockfighting and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a
First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2263 (2004).
139. Id. at 2263 (footnote omitted).
140. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (discussing the extent to which a state may
infringe upon a person's First Amendment right to burn a cross).
141. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 627 (1943) (quoting the West Virginia Board of Education resolution recog-
nizing that the flag was a "symbol of the Nation's power" and prestige and an "emblem
of freedom").
142. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (noting that although burning a
draft card may constitute symbolic speech, the government had an interest in regulating
such action that was not related to the suppression of speech).
143. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that wearing an armband, which does not disrupt school activities, is protected by the
First Amendment).
144. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITuTIoNALLAw: PRINCIPLESAND POLICIES 1026 (2nd
ed. 2002) (recognizing that not every action that conveys a meaning is necessarily protected
under the First Amendment).
145. Id.
146. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 1027 (discussing
symbolic speech that communicates a protected message).
147. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
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message would be understood by those receiving it." 4 ' Body protest
still faces some challenges under symbolic speech analysis, however.
Although in Virginia v. Black the Court specifically conceded that
it could not disregard that certain objects like the cross hold cultural
significance,'49 courts have been reluctant to extend protection to body
expressions, as has been evident in the nude cases."5 The courts lim-
ited their analysis in these cases to, first, interpreting the body as
conveying an erotic message, and second, balancing the individual's
right against the state's interest in controlling immorality.1 5' In such
balancing tests, the Court has often determined that the erotic expres-
sion in these cases does not outweigh the state's interest in regulating
immorality or alleged crime. 52 'The Court has been particularly wary
of interpreting any message nude dancing - the striptease - may
communicate. The Court has held that dance itself, even where it
occurs in a dance hall, is not necessarily protected speech." 53 Had the
Court interpreted the use of the female body as protected speech, the
legislative and judicial bodies would then have the burden of enacting
and upholding laws to protect such speech.
Limiting the interpretation of the use of female body to erotic
expression excludes all other potential interpretations.'54 Although
any discussion of body politics must acknowledge the work of some
feminist scholars in demonstrating agency through women's use of
their bodies in the areas of pornography and prostitution,'55 more
traditional women may use their bodies to communicate a message
as well. Furthermore, arguing for the recognition of female body pro-
test as protected speech, of course, does not negate the fact that body
148. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 1027.
149. See 538 U.S. 343, 352-57 (2003) (discussing the evolution of cross-burning in the
United States).
150. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (reiterating the Court's
opinion that the act of dancing nude only necessitated the "barest minimum of protected
expression"); Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 277 (1999), (involving an analysis
of Pennsylvania's public nudity prohibition in which the majority qualified public nudity
to exist only in "the peripheral boundaries of the First Amendment protection"); see also
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 27 (1989) (showing the Court's reluctance to protect recre-
ational dancing as a form of expression).
151. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563; see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296 (holding that
Pennsylvania was entitled to protect public health and safety by prohibiting public nudity
under all circumstances without regards to its message).
152. See id.
153. Zick, supra note 138, at 2284.
154. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 291 (assuming an "erotic message" without exploring
other possible interpretations).
155. See generally Celine Parrefias Shimizu, Queens of Anal, Double, Triple, and the
Gang Bang: Producing Asian/American Feminism in Pornography, 18 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 235 (presenting the sex-positive feminist ideals of porn stars like Asia Carrera
and Annabel Chong).
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protest can also be manifested by male bodies, nor does it imply that
all uses of the female body should constitute protected speech. 56 This
article is meant only to advocate that symbolically expressive conduct
by women, whom I refer to as "organic feminists" (everyday women
using their bodies as a means for expression) is extremely important.
The analysis in this article also suggests that feminist jurisprudence,
and American jurisprudence in general, work with these organic femi-
nists to protect female body expression.
My argument demands that courts consider female body expres-
sion on a case by case basis to determine whether specific uses of the
female body should be protected as a form of expression. This deter-
mination is within the purview of the courts. 15 7 Similar to other forms
of expressive conduct, body expression should benefit from constitu-
tional protection and attempts at restricting such expression should
be subject to the court's scrutiny.158 As the courts have done in pre-
vious circumstances, i.e., the school desegregation cases or, more re-
cently, in interpreting the meaning of the use of the burning cross,
the courts can borrow from sociological and ethnographic studies to
decipher the meaning of specific acts using the female body.159 Ulti-
mately, an interdisciplinary approach provides courts with a strong
tool to determine if an individual's conduct is expression.
B. The First Amendment and Freedom of Expression
Expression through manner of dress is a common form of sym-
bolic speech, one that has been powerfully used by individuals of all
ages and in diverse contexts. "o For example, some middle school girls
used this form of expression in the nineties:
As an eighth-grader in Ames Middle School in Ames, Iowa,
Erin Rollenhagen spoke out against sexism in her school. In
response to the Hooters restaurant t-shirts the boys in her
school were wearing, which showed an owl whose eyes resem-
bled women's breasts and the words "More than a Mouthful"
156. See Alexandre, supra note 1, at 178-79 (defining body protest); Barbara Sutton,
Naked Protest: Memories of Bodies and Resistance at the World Social Forum, 8 J. INT'L
WOMEN'S STUD. 139, 146 (2007) (discussing "different stakes for male and female naked
protests").
157. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (discussing student
protest through wearing armbands as a form of expression).
158. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 1028 (discussing judicial scrutiny of expressive
conduct).
159. For examples of the Supreme Court using sociological and ethnographic studies
see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352-57 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330
(2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 n.4 (1954).
160. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
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written on the back, Rollenhagen and several friends created
their own parody t-shirts, "Cocks - Nothing to Crow About,"
with the graphic of a rooster on the front. Several of the Ames
students were suspended when they refused to turn the "Cocks"
shirts inside-out while they are at school. Eventually both shirts
were banned from the school, and the suspended students were
allowed back to school.
16
By their manner of dress and expression, these middle school girls
were able to bring national attention to the bias and demeaning be-
havior of their peers.'62 Eventually, the school prevented the boys
from wearing the degrading shirts.' These middle school girls chose
a powerful weapon to counter the misogyny that the young men's
shirts projected.'" They chose to express themselves through their
clothing in a manner consistent with the message they wanted to
convey."6 5 The message in the shirts that they chose to wear was that,
at their young age, they could turn misogyny on its head and directly
fight it.' 66 This manner of expression, the ability to express oneself
through speech, conduct, or manner of dress is yet another way of
expressing an individual's essence and uniqueness.'67 This right is
of the utmost importance" and has been recognized as such by our
jurisprudence.'69
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that freedom of speech
is not absolute, v° infringement on expressive conduct is subject to
161. Iowa Women's Archives, Erin Rollenhagen Papers 1994-1995, http://sdrc.lib
.uiowa.edu/iwa/findingaids/html/RollenhagenErin.htm (biography of Erin Rollenhagen)
[hereinafter Erin Rollenhagen Papers].
162. NAN STEIN, CLASSROOMS AND CouRTRooMs: FACING SEXUAL HARRASSMENT IN K-
12 SCHOOLS 76-77 (1999) ('They got their public forum, and about 300 people attended,
including the national director of the American Civil Liberties Union .....
163. Id. at 76.
164. See Erin Rollenhagen Papers, supra note 161.
165. STEIN, supra note 162, at 76-77.
166. See id.
167. Karl E. KIare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1405, 1409-10 (1992).
168. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003)
("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").... [Tihe First Amend-
ment "ordinarily" denies a State "the power to prohibit dissemination of social,
economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes
to be false and fraught with evil consequence." The First Amendment affords
protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.
Id. (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 360 n.2 ("[I]t is equally true that the First Amendment protects symbolic
conduct as well as pure speech.").
170. Id. at 358-59 ('The First Amendment permits 'restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that
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judicial scrutiny to ensure that a sufficient interest justifies the gov-
ernment action.171 Several exceptions have been recognized, however,
in which speech is not protected by the First Amendment at all.
172
Three such exceptions to the First Amendment's no viewpoint restric-
tion are: 1) obscenity; 173 2) "true threats,"1 74 and 3) advertising with
the intent to defraud. 175 The examples of body protest or expression
this article advocates do not fall with any of these categories, how-
ever. Restrictions of these forms of body expression should be granted
First Amendment protection.
These types of bodily expression, like that of the young middle
school children, are also exhibited in the public employment context
by adults. Employees use these forms of expression as body protest
and a form of speech. Like the principal of the middle school children,
many employers, uncomfortable with the employee's expression, take
disciplinary measures or find pretexts to terminate employment. But
the cases involving employers' disagreement over employee grooming
choices have been primarily litigated under Title VII's gender dis-
crimination clause. 76 This legal avenue, however, has not been ade-
quate in capturing the full extent of the speech rights at issue.1 77 The
appellate courts in numerous circuits have reiterated the principle
that distinctions based on gender that are deemed to have insignif-
icant effects do not violate Title VII.1 78 In following this principle,
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality'."').
171. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 1028.
172. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (stating "that obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment").
173. Id.
174. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
175. Henry Cohen, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment
8 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code 95-815, updated Sept. 9,
2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization110843.pdf.
176. Mare, supra note 167, at 1414.
177. Id. at 1415 (arguing that Title VII jurisprudence may reinforce stereotypes).
178. See Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (1996) (citing Barker v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977)); Earwood v. Cont'l Se. Lines,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Knott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252
(8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tele. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975);
Baker v. Ca. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046
(1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Boyce v.
Gen. Ry. Signal Co., No. 99-CV-6225T, 2004 WL 1574023, at *2 (D.N.Y. June 10, 2004)
(discussing the facts of Tavora).
In a case directly on point, Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange; the
Second Circuit held that an employer's policy requiring male, but not female,
employees to have short hair did not violate Title VII. In that case, the plain-
tiff was terminated for failing to comply with a male hair length policy. The
plaintiff filed suit alleging that the policy discriminated on the basis of gender
because it placed no similar restriction on female employees. The Second
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determining what effects are "significant" should result from a more
objective and bias-free judicial assessment of what type of employ-
ment policy presents a burden.179 The absence of a bias-free assess-
ment as to the effects of these policies is yet another reason why the
First Amendment context would be better to litigate grooming cases
in public employment.
Generally, however, litigants in public employment First Amend-
ment cases have failed to showcase grooming choices as symbolic
speech. is Instead, public employment speech cases have generally,
and not very successfully, centered on issues of retaliation for whistle-
blowing or other statements about the nature of the employment.''
This tradition, however, does not preclude a more successful use of
the First Amendment as a cause of action in expression cases where
an employee alleges that an employer infringed on his or her right
of expression by sexually profiling his or her manner of dress and
behavior. 2
The current public employment First Amendment cases provide
us with a good starting point for developing a standard that would
guide the analysis of grooming cases under the First Amendment."s'
Public employment speech, like all speech, does not receive absolute
protection."'4 Speech relating to the public usually triggers the highest
Circuit... held that 'requiring short hair on men and not on women does
not violate Title VII.'...
As noted by the court in Tavora, every other federal court of appeals that
has considered the issue of male hair-length policies has upheld such policy,
finding either that the policy did not conflict with the statutory goal of equal
employment or that it had only de minimis effect on employment opportu-
nities.
Boyce, 2004 WL 1574023, at *2 (citations omitted).
179. Cf. J. Michael McGuinness, Developments in Public Employee First Amendment
and Equal Protection Law, in SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION COURSE HANDBOOK
(24th Annual, Practising Law Institute 2007) (discussing the "similar and comparable"
standard as an objective fact question). Perhaps the significant effect standard should be
objective as well.
180. See Joshua Waldman, Note, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1844, 1869-72 (1997) (discussing that although the dissent in Olff v. East Side Union
High School District recognized that grooming may constitute symbolic speech, an aggre-
gate review of relevant case law reveals that courts are not fully utilizing an in-depth
analysis of grooming as a type of symbolic speech).
181. See McGuinness, supra note 179, at 132-33, 143-44 (discussing various cases where
"whistleblowing" speech was considered protected under the First Amendment).
182. See id. at 113, 133 (discussing cases of sexual harassment and whistleblowing as
protected speech). With courts applying the First Amendment freedom of expression to
sexual harassment and whistleblowing claims, cases of sexual profiling by manner of dress
is a logical extension.
183. See id. at 105-119 (outlining the reasoning in the more recent First Amendment
expression cases for public employees).
184. Id. at 164-65.
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protection. 85 Thus, employers are far from free to punish employees
for making statements about their employment. 86 Still, even when
the speech is shown to be of public and not individual concern, a bal-
ancing test that weighs the interest of the government against the
value of the protected speech tends to strengthen the employer's posi-
tion."8 ' Despite this limitation, the public employment free speech
cases provide a hopeful area for showcasing and resolving the issues
that result from sexual stereotyping of public employees based on
dress and/or conduct. Expanding the consideration of grooming cases
under the First Amendment would only be the first step. Each case,
of course, would have to be analyzed according to the balancing test
created in Pickering v. Board of Education."8
V. RECONCILING FIRST AMENDMENT BASED SEXUAL PROFILING
CLAIMS WITH PICKERING, CONNICK, AND GARCETTI
In Supreme Court jurisprudence, courts can discern a clear stan-
dard to apply in grooming cases in order to fully protect employees'
symbolic speech, while balancing employers' interests. The cases of
Pickering v. Board of Education,89 Connick v. Meyers,'" and Garcetti
v. Ceballos'9' provide a framework for courts to use in examining
employees' First Amendment rights in the public employment con-
text. The placement of an employee's grooming choices within free
speech jurisprudence would provide enhanced protection to expres-
sion through body protest.
Following Pickering, the subjective nature of the speech and its
truth or falsity should be irrelevant." The threshold question should
be "whether the statements, irrespective of their truth or falsity,
raised a 'matter of public concern."" 93 In the recent public employ-
ment speech cases, the Supreme Court has placed greater restrictions
185. Id. at 94-95 ('CThe greater the degree of public concern of the issues, the greater
the degree of constitutional protection.... [S]peech, which merely relates to some isolated
personal interest does not relate to a matter of public concern unless the broader consid-
eration of that issue relates to some public interest." (citations omitted)).
186. Id. at 94-95.
187. See id. at 98-99.
188. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); McGuinness, supra note 179, at 98.
189. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563.
190. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
191. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
192. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75 & n.6; Pilkington v. Bevilacqua 439 F.Supp.
465, 473 ("[Ihe state-employer has no greater power to limit the false statements of an
employee than the truthful statements unless it can show that the employee's activities
impeded the proper performance of his daily duties....").
193. Buschi v. Kirvin, 775 F.2d 1240, 1248 (4th Cir. 1985).
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on the protection accorded to speech in the workplace.'94 Despite these
restrictions, however, the First Amendment offers more promise in the
analysis of grooming issues than Title VII. Although the courts' defer-
ence to public employers' interests have strengthened in the past few
years, courts still apply the balancing tests created to deal with these
issues.19 The tests are instrumental because they represent the key
to understanding the importance and relevance of the grooming cases.
To make a First Amendment claim alleging a violation of sym-
bolic speech due to sexual profiling based on dress and/or conduct, the
standard enunciated in Pickering is an important starting point.'96
In Pickering, a teacher published a letter that was critical of the school
to the editor in a local newspaper.'97 The teacher was subsequently
dismissed when the school board determined that the letter had a
negative effect on the school operations.19 In Pickering, the Court
developed a balancing test to deal with First Amendment claims
brought by public employees.' The Court conceded that these types
of cases are so diverse that a general standard would not be appro-
priate.2 °° It is significant that the Pickering balancing test does not
involve a general standard, but rather gives the trier of fact more
flexibility to analyze the relevant issues based on the facts at hand.2"'
Furthermore, the Court held that employees in the public sector
"may not be punished for making statements on matters of public
concern unless it is established by the employer that the employee's
statements caused substantial disruption to or interference with the
performance of his own duties or with the proper functioning of the
employing public agency."202 Under this test, a plaintiff bringing a
First Amendment claim alleging infringement due to sexually stereo-
typical restrictions would have to first show that the nature of the
speech is of public concern, not simply of individual importance.2 3
It is then incumbent upon the employer to show that the particular
expression in question presents a "disruption" to, or "interference"
with the administration of the agency.20 4
194. See McGuinness, supra note 179, at 104-05.
195. Id. at 98; see, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 575; Garcetti 457 U.S. 421-22.
196. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574; McGuinness, supra note 179, at 98-99.
197. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
198. Id.
199. McGuinness, supra note 179, at 138.
200. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
201. Id. ("Because of the enormous variety of fact situations ... we do not deem it either
appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard ... .
202. McGuinness, supra note 179, at 98-99.
203. Id. at 95, 98.
204. Id. at 98-99.
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The Pickering test was refined in Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle when the Supreme Court enunciated
that after an employee demonstrates that his or her speech is consti-
tutionally protected speech and was the chief motivating factor for
the employer's adverse decision, the burden shifts to the employer to
"show[] by a preponderance of evidence that it would have reached
the same decision.., even in the absence of the" particular speech.2 °5
Under this test, Marcia from the previously discussed hypo-
thetical would demonstrate how her symbolic speech - her choice
of clothing - relates to the greater public issue of promoting the
elimination of gender bias and sexual stereotypes in the workplace
and that her choice of expression was the exact reason why her em-
ployment was terminated. The employer would in turn have to show
that it would have terminated Marcia even if she had not engaged
in that particular expression.
The Supreme Court subsequently further narrowed Pickering by
limiting the matters that could be deemed to be of "public concern."206
Furthermore, Connick v. Meyers lessened the burden on the public
employer.2" ' In Connick, an assistant district attorney circulated a
questionnaire to seek the support of her co-workers against an im-
pending transfer.20 8 The Supreme Court reversed the district court
and circuit court decisions, which had found that her conduct was
protected.20 9 Contrary to the lower courts, the Supreme Court found
that the employee's conduct presented a substantial interference.
[The Court] observed that "government offices could not function
if every employment decision became a constitutional matter."...
The Court in Connick concluded that only one question con-
tained in the employee survey, which dealt with the pressure to
work in political campaigns on behalf of employer supported can-
didates, was [a] matter of public concern. Applying Pickering,
the employer was given an opportunity to demonstrate that the
employee's activity interfered with "the interest of the state, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service it
performs through it [sic] employees." The Court found that the
burden placed upon the employer by the District Court was un-
duly onerous.210
205. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
206. See McGuinness, supra note 179, at 126-32 (describing the different factors that
impact a court determination of protected or unprotected speech).
207. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); McGuinness, supra note 179,
at 101.
208. Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
209. Id. at 138-39.
210. McGuinness, supra note 179, at 100-01.
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The Court also found "that the district court's lack of 'deference to the
employer's judgment' was inappropriate." '211 "[T]he state employer
need not 'clearly demonstrate' that the speech 'substantially inter-
fered' with office efficiency, but rather that the employer possessed
a reasonable belief thereof."212
In order to survive Connick, Marcia would have to demonstrate
that her grooming choice is a form of expression that makes a state-
ment of inherent public concern that does not substantially interfere
with the workplace. Her statement is of public concern because public
employment should be one of the first sites where gender stereotypes
are dismantled. Marcia's form of expression will help destroy such
stereotypes in the public sphere as well as provide a model for the rest
of society. Thus, courts should seriously analyze the types of grooming
choices they protect, which will ultimately dismantle societal stereo-
types, paying particular attention to their potential for making state-
ments that are of compelling public concern.213 Marcia still, however,
has to overcome the added hurdles imposed by Garcetti v. Ceballos."4
Garcetti, the precursor to the most recent line of cases, further
restricted the scope of an employee's freedom of speech in the employ-
ment context by ruling that employees do not enjoy First Amendment
protection when their speech is made in the course of their official
duties.2"5 Ceballos worked as a deputy district attorney for the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's office.21 6 During his employment
he became concerned about a criminal case and began to actively rec-
ommend its dismissal.217 Shortly thereafter, Ceballos began experi-
encing adverse treatment at his work.21 ' He sued, alleging that his
employers took retaliatory actions in response to his statements.219
The Supreme Court first reiterated the Pickering test 220 and then
stated:
[T]he controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expres-
sions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy....
211. Jaime Haggard, Casenote, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - First
Amendment Does Not Confer Liability on Government Employer for Discipline Resulting
from Public Employee's Speech Made Pursuant Solely to Employment Duties, 37 CUMB.
L. REv. 339, 349 (2007).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (stating that matters
of public concern should be afforded First Amendment protection).
214. 457 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
215. Id. at 421-22.
216. Id. at 413.
217. Id. at 414.
218. Id. at 415.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 417.
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We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not in-
sulate their communications from employer discipline.. 221
Thus, an employee under Garcetti would receive more First Amend-
ment protections when speaking as a private citizen than when speak-
ing within the scope of his or her employment.222 Even this seemingly
extreme restriction on speech rights, however, only diminishes pro-
tection when the speech occurs in the context of "official duties." 22
The mere fact of being in the place of employment will generally not
be sufficient.224 But if, as with Garcetti, the speech in question occurs
in official duties, such as in an official memorandum relating to the
employee's duties, then the employee's speech right will likely be
eroded.225
Despite this erosion, a claim like Marcia's would still survive
Garcetti. First, her form of expression is independent of the applica-
tion of her official duties. Her expression, in fact, occurs as a private
citizen concerned about gender bias, including gender bias in the
public employment context. Second, her manner of dress is not closely
related to a meeting, a memorandum, or any other official aspect of
her employment. Furthermore, Marcia's expression is worthy of the
utmost protection under Pickering and Garcetti because her speech
is both of public concern and not substantially disruptive to her
employer's operations.
VI. LEARNING BY ANALOGY: THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION CASES
The sexual orientation cases brought under various provisions
of the Bill of Rights might provide insight for the future of grooming
cases litigated under the First Amendment's speech clause. In our
jurisprudence, courts have traditionally relied on disturbing stereo-
types about gays and lesbians - stereotypes that are as ingrained
and destructive as the traditional gender stereotypes associated with
221. Id. at 421-22 (citations omitted).
222. See id. at 421.
223. Id.
224. For an example of what constitutes "official duties" see e.g., Boykin v. City of Baton
Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 439 F. Supp.2d 605, 609 (D. La. 2006) (discussing the
drafting of an official report).
225. E.g., Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007); Casey
v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist.,473 F.3d 1323, 1329, 1331 (10th Cir. 2007); Green v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 798, 801 (10th Cir. 2007); Battle v. Bd. of Regents
for Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006).
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women. 226 In general, treatment of cases involving the rights of homo-
sexuals has been very conservative, especially in the employment con-
text. For example, courts have repeatedly given particular deference
to an employer's assertion that the hiring of a gay or lesbian employee
would cause substantial disturbance to the workplace.227 In Childers
v. Dallas Police Dept., where the plaintiff "was not hired for a posi-
tion in the city police department evidence room, in part, because of
his gay activities," the court found no violation of the First Amend-
ment because the employer demonstrated "that its refusal to hire the
employee was justified and necessary to prevent material and sub-
stantial interference with the employee's performance of his duties
and the efficient operation of the government." 22
But even in light of such conservative treatment, judicial prog-
ress has been made in the realm of constitutional protections for
homosexuals.229 A review of Supreme Court jurisprudence illustrates
an initial hostile reaction toward homosexual rights in Bowers v.
Hardwick,23 which was later progressed by decisions such as Romer
226. Compare Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Federal and State Constitutional
Provisions as Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment on Basis of Gay, Lesbian or
Bisexual Orientation or Conduct, 96 A.L.R.5th 391, 407 (2002) (stating that "[e]mploy-
ment discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons has a long history of
acceptance"), with Geraldine A. Del Prado, The United Nations and the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Women: How Well Has the Organization Fulfilled its
Responsibility?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 51, 60 (1995) (stating that "[s]tereoty-pes
about traditional gender roles... play a large part in inhibiting the advancement of
women").
227. See Miller, supra note 226, at 441-42 for a list of cases in which the substantial
disturbance rationale is upheld by the courts.
228. Id. at 449 (citing Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 148 (D. Tex.
1981).
229. Note that a smaller scale advancement of gay civil rights may be found in the
military context. For examples of such expansion, see Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182
(1st Cir. 1985) and benShalom v. Sec'y of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (D. Wis. 1980). The
decisions in Matthews and benShalom depart from the traditional conservative treatment
of cases involving the rights of homosexuals in the military. In benShalom it was held
that the military's discharge of the plaintiff based on an expressed interest in homo-
sexuality without evidence of actual homosexual conduct violated her First Amendment
rights. See benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 974. In Matthews, although the 1st Circuit re-
manded the case based on the plaintiff's later admission that she had engaged in homo-
sexual behavior, the district court found that 'Matthews' statement about her sexual
preferences and her status as a homosexual both fall within the general ambit of first
amendment rights .... See Matthews, 755 F.2d at 183-84. Furthermore, although the
Clinton administration's later enactment of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy proved to
be a step back for gay rights in the military, many in the legal community speculate that
this policy will be repealed by President Obama. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2008) (codified
version of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy); Rowan Scarborough, Obama to Delay 'Don't
Ask, Don't Tell' Repeal, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2008/nov/21/obama-to-delay-repeal-of-dont-ask-dont-tell.
230. See generally, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state sodomy
statutes as permissible under the Constitution).
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v. Evans21 and Lawrence v. Texas2 32 - cases that serve as hallmarks
for the advancement of gay civil rights. In Romer, the Supreme Court
found that a statewide referendum prohibiting all forms of govern-
ment action to protect the rights of homosexuals was unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause.233 And more recently, in
Lawrence, the Court found that a state statute criminalizing private,
consensual, sodomy between homosexuals also violated the Equal
Protection Clause - in contrast to its holding in Bowers which up-
held such state sodomy bans.2 34 Notably, to justify the overruling of
Bowers, the Lawrence Court enumerated that the legal history and
tradition surrounding a particular right is merely a starting point
rather than an ending point as to the extent of protection that right
deserves under the Constitution.235 In light of this principle regarding
the progression of individual protections, the Court's expansion of gay
civil rights2 36 as well as the judicial recognition that sexual stereo-
typing is actionable under Title VII,237 are thus good omens for the
future viability and expansion of rights for grooming cases under the
First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Grooming cases are extremely hard to litigate because sexual
profiling is an ingrained and significant practice in our society. Al-
though the letter of the law advocates for formal gender equality,
societal stereotypes have undermined many would-be protections for
employees in the Title VII context. Still, there is no denying our con-
stitutional jurisprudence's reverence for the protection of important
personal rights. Although we have seen that courts often fall prey
to enforcing gender stereotypes, the contradictory sex stereotyping
cases and the Supreme Court sexual orientation cases showcase a
burgeoning commitment to eradicating gender bias. Through their
decisions, courts have actually acknowledged the limitations these
stereotypes impose on plaintiffs and society,238 truly highlighting
231. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,620,632 (1996) (striking down a state-wide Colorado
referendum that "precluded all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state
or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their 'homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships").
232. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing a constitutional
protection for consensual sex acts between homosexuals in the privacy of the home).
233. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
234. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584-85.
235. Id. at 571-72.
236. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
237. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51, 258 (1989).
238. See Miller, supra note 226, at 425 (discussing societal myths and false stereotypes).
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the full potential of our individual rights jurisprudence. Thus, it is
worthwhile to advocate for the analysis of gender-based employment
decisions under the First Amendment whenever appropriate.
The possibility of eradicating gender bias using the First Amend-
ment's right to public employment speech that is a "public concern,"
as well as the expansion of gay civil rights by the Supreme Court,
should strengthen our belief in the redemptive potential of the Bill
of Rights. Furthermore, it should reaffirm the viability of attacking
gender bias on all fronts so that, eventually, the fight against one
form of gender restriction can help arm us to fight against others.
